Voters Decide Government, Not Just Political Parties

The All Progressives Congress (APC) lost the Osun governorship election before the voting started. I believe it lost when it chose how to select its candidate. This does not mean candidate selection alone decides election results. Elections are complex. From my experience as a teacher of politics and my involvement in elections, I think the way APC chose its candidate caused a big problem that the party could not fix by election day. The Osun election should be seen not just as a battle between Ademola Adeleke and Bola Oyebamiji. It is a lesson about party democracy, candidate legitimacy, and the growing independence of Nigerian voters.

To understand why APC lost, we need to look back at its candidate selection process. There were nine initial aspirants: Bola Oyebamiji, Mulikat Abiola Jimoh, Senator Iyiola Omisore, former Deputy Governor Benedict Olugboyega Alabi, Dotun Babayemi, Dr Akinade Akanmu Ogunbiyi, Senator Babajide Omoworare, Kunle Adegoke (SAN), and Babatunde Haketer Oralusi. The screening committee only cleared Oyebamiji and Jimoh, while the others were disqualified due to party rules. This caused controversy as the disqualified aspirants challenged the screening process.

Eventually, seven aspirants, including Alabi, Babayemi, Ogunbiyi, Omoworare, Adegoke, Oralusi, and Jimoh, stepped down to support Oyebamiji after meeting President Bola Tinubu in Abuja. Senator Omisore did not attend that meeting and had previously rejected his disqualification. The APC confirmed Oyebamiji through a voice vote, not a competitive primary where members could choose between candidates. President Tinubu congratulated Oyebamiji, calling the process one of unity and reconciliation.

There is nothing wrong with reaching consensus in political parties. Consensus can help avoid damaging competition and keep party unity. The issue arises when the agreement of party elites is assumed to mean the agreement of all members. These are not the same. A candidate may support a consensus candidate, but many people who backed the original aspirant might not agree. An elite decision can stop a fight among leaders but does not fix the issues supporters have. This point is key to understanding APC's experience in Osun.

Political science shows that how candidates are chosen affects who holds power in a party. Hazan and Rahat (2010), in their book Democracy within Parties, explain that the method of candidate selection influences political power within a party. Their idea of the “selectorate” is useful here. A selectorate can be small and controlled by elites or large and inclusive. The smaller the selectorate, the more a small group can determine who becomes a candidate.

This is why the Nigerian phrase “party supremacy” needs careful thought. In a real democratic party, party supremacy means following the party's constitution and legitimate decisions. It should not mean that a few leaders have power over ordinary members. Political parties need leaders, but leaders do not make up the whole party. Ward members, local government organizers, grassroots mobilizers, and regular party supporters are also part of the party. If they are not included in key decisions about who represents them, a party may still exist but lose its democratic spirit.

Robert Michels’ famous study of political organizations is relevant here. In Political Parties, Michels (1911) introduced the idea of the iron law of oligarchy, saying that “who says organization, says oligarchy.” He argued that organizations tend to give more power to a small leadership group. Michels was not writing about Nigeria, but his insight is important: when political organizations are dominated by a few who control information and decisions, they may start to serve their leaders more than their members. This is a challenge for Nigerian political parties.

I do not think it is fair to blame Oyebamiji alone for APC’s defeat. He was a serious candidate, getting 444,815 votes and winning 11 of Osun’s 30 local government areas. Adeleke received 511,067 votes and won 19 local government areas, with a margin of 66,252 votes. This was a competitive election, not a total loss for APC.

My point is about how Oyebamiji came to be the candidate. He took over a party that was already divided and had issues over candidate selection. He became the consensus candidate after many aspirants withdrew, while another major aspirant, Omisore, did not join the reconciliation meeting that made the consensus. It is fair to see Oyebamiji as a product of a troubled process, but this should not reflect negatively on his character or skills.

A candidate can be strong and still carry the baggage of the process that brought him to the race. This is why candidate selection is crucial. The problems from the primary can follow a candidate into the main election. If reconciliation efforts carry on until election day, it shows that the nomination process did not really solve the issues. A party should be focusing on its campaign, getting voters excited, and spreading its message, not fixing its internal problems. This is not a good way to prepare for elections.

The bigger lesson from Osun goes beyond APC. It lies with the voters. For too long, Nigerian politics has treated voters as if they are just extensions of political parties. Once a party picked its candidate, it was assumed that supporters would follow. But Nigerian voters are becoming smarter, and the Osun election shows this.

Adeleke gives a clear example. He openly supported President Bola Tinubu for a second term in 2027 while running against Tinubu’s party in the Osun governorship election. This means a voter could support Tinubu for President and Adeleke for governor without seeing any problem with that. Understanding this is important for seeing how Nigerians vote. Voters can tell the difference between national and state elections, between individual politicians and political parties, and between policy performance and party loyalty.

This view aligns with our own recent research. In The Ballots Without the Voters, Bello and Olaniyan (2026) argue that simply looking at voter registration does not fully explain electoral participation in Nigeria. They show that voter education and political awareness interact with trust in institutions, electoral credibility, and security, shaping how citizens engage with democracy.

The link to Osun is clear. A politically aware voter does not just follow a party leader's commands. Political awareness can lead to the opposite: the ability to look at candidates, judge their performance, and make independent choices. In that sense, the growing awareness of Nigerian voters may become a strong check on political manipulation by the elite.

Anthony Downs (1957) provides another helpful way to think about this. His rational choice approach sees voters as people who make decisions based on their options and interests. While no model can fully capture the emotional and social aspects of Nigerian voting, Downs’ key idea remains relevant: voters have agency. They do not just wait for politicians to guide them.

Electoral accountability is another important angle. Elections give citizens the chance to reward or punish governments. An incumbent governor enters an election with both benefits and burdens. Adeleke was not asking voters to choose an unknown candidate but to judge his record in office.

This means APC’s defeat cannot be blamed only on its primary election. Adeleke’s time in office, his campaign, his popularity, political connections, and his relationship with the voters must also be considered. The best explanation looks at many factors: APC’s internal issues gave Adeleke a chance, while his strengths let him take that chance.

I agree that “the people won,” but I would add a note of caution. No serious look at this election should ignore the problems that might have happened. There were reports of vote buying, violence, and other electoral issues. These should not be overlooked just because the final result was clear.

But having some electoral problems does not automatically mean an election is invalid. The key question is whether the voters could make a meaningful choice that reflects their true preferences. In Osun, the numbers show a clear difference between the two main candidates. Adeleke got 511,067 votes, while Oyebamiji had 444,815, giving a margin of 66,252 votes. He won 19 local government areas, while Oyebamiji won 11.

This is significant because electoral legitimacy is not just about having no irregularities. It comes from credible institutions, real competition, voter choice, and results that connect to the votes cast. Our recent work on electoral integrity, Bello, Akinlade, and Olaniyan (2026), also emphasizes how electoral institutions and security agencies affect the electoral process. The work is titled Guardians or Gatekeepers? Security Agencies and Nigeria’s Electoral Integrity.

The takeaway is that Nigeria must keep improving its electoral institutions while recognizing when voters successfully express their preferences.

I also think Nigerians should applaud President Tinubu for how the Osun election turned out, but this claim must be made carefully. There is no clear proof that President Tinubu decided Adeleke should win or ordered anyone to ensure the election went to the incumbent governor. Making such a claim would go beyond the facts.

However, there is a valid political question about how the federal government chose not to use its power to ensure an APC win. President Tinubu had directly intervened in APC’s internal process, bringing aspirants together and pushing for support around Oyebamiji. But after the primary, the President did not publicly say that the APC nomination meant they should win the general election. His public stance focused on reconciliation and the electoral process rather than a federal campaign to back the APC candidate.

This raises an interesting political idea. A smart politician does not always try to win every election. Sometimes, the best strategy is to avoid fighting an election where forcing a result could cause more harm than good. If intelligence suggested that the incumbent governor had strong support among voters, trying to change that through federal power could lead to significant political backlash.

Another key point is that Adeleke had already publicly supported President Tinubu for a second term in 2027. So, from a strategic angle, Adeleke winning in Osun did not necessarily mean a loss for Tinubu. This does not prove that the President thought this way. It just makes the idea believable. This difference between evidence and assumption is important.

The political events in Anambra also offer a useful comparison, though the two elections should not be seen as identical. The broader lesson is that a President might gain more by looking above partisan electoral manipulation than trying to use federal influence to win every state election for his party.

The strategy is straightforward. A President’s main goal is national. Winning every governorship election is not always essential for national survival. Sometimes, letting voters make their own choice can enhance the President’s legitimacy and alliances.

This is why the Osun election could be more complex than just an APC defeat. It might also show a careful approach by the federal leadership. Again, this is an interpretation, not a fact.

When I say that Nigerians will increasingly “take over governance,” I do not mean that President Tinubu will be defeated in 2027. I am not saying the Osun result is a national rejection of the President. I believe that none of the current alternatives have made a strong enough case to make Tinubu’s re-election impossible.

At the same time, supporting the President does not mean supporting everything he does. His reforms may be necessary, but they need to be better executed, especially in how their costs and benefits are shared. A mature political view should support reform while demanding credible elections.

This is what “taking back governance” means. Nigerians are starting to see that politicians need their votes more than citizens need any particular politician. They are slowly realizing that political parties are just tools for competition, not owners of the voters. They understand that a party can choose a candidate but cannot force anyone to vote for that candidate.

Our argument in Bello and Olaniyan (2026) about political awareness is relevant here. Voter participation becomes meaningful when people understand the electoral process and can make informed choices. Institutions must provide an environment where those choices count.

This brings me back to the idea of party supremacy. Political parties should be strong. They should have rules. Their members should respect legitimate decisions. But party supremacy cannot mean a small group of leaders makes decisions and then uses party loyalty to stop members from questioning those decisions.

Hazan and Rahat (2010) remind us that who selects candidates is really about who holds power in a political organization. The more inclusive the selection process, the wider the political influence. The more exclusive it is, the more power shifts to the elite.

This is the lesson APC and other Nigerian parties need to take seriously. Party leaders are guardians of political organizations. They do not own the electorate. The voters have the power.

If APC reacts to Osun by just forming another reconciliation committee, it will miss the bigger lesson. Reconciliation is important, but doing it without fixing the system is only a temporary fix. The party needs to look at why so many aspirants were unhappy, whether its screening processes are trusted, if its internal appeal processes are credible, and whether regular members feel they have a real say in choosing candidates.

The party also needs to realize that elite agreements and grassroots agreement are not the same. A meeting in Abuja might bring peace among top politicians, but that peace must reach the ward and polling unit. A candidate cannot be owned by a party just because the leadership has endorsed him.

Consensus works best when everyone believes they had a fair shot at winning. Otherwise, it can just be political showmanship.

I think Oyebamiji should accept the outcome with grace. This is not because he did not fight hard or is an unworthy candidate. The numbers show he is a serious political figure. Over 444,000 voters in Osun chose him, and he won in 11 local government areas.

But political careers go beyond one election. If Oyebamiji accepts the result with dignity, congratulates Adeleke, and stays active in politics, he could actually boost his political standing. Accepting defeat is not a sign of weakness. In mature democracies, being able to lose gracefully can be as important as winning.

He should avoid being defined only by this defeat. He has shown he has a significant political base. The next step is to turn that base into a lasting political career.

The biggest lesson from Osun is not just that Adeleke won or that Oyebamiji lost. It is that Nigerian voters are becoming more aware of the power they hold.

Political parties select candidates. Political leaders negotiate. Elites form coalitions. But voters select governments. This difference is the foundation on which Nigeria’s democratic future should be built.

The old idea of Nigerian politics assumed that elites would decide, parties would organize, godfathers would mobilize, and voters would follow. This model is fading, but it is not gone. Money still matters. Political structures still matter. Party machinery still matters. Incumbency still matters. Political networks still matter. But the voter is becoming harder to treat as a mere tool for politicians.

The Osun election represents more than Adeleke’s win. It shows that Nigerian voters can separate party from candidate, federal issues from state issues, and elite preferences from their own judgments. This is what I mean by Nigerians gradually taking control of governance. I do not mean replacing elected officials. I mean they are reclaiming the political power that democracy grants them.

As a political educator, this is the key lesson I find in Osun. Political parties can control their primaries, but they do not control the general election. Political leaders may choose the party’s flag bearer, but they cannot decide who has the people's mandate. A party may claim its decision is supreme, but the voter has the final say. The APC should look past the immediate loss and ask a deeper question: did Osun reject Oyebamiji or did Osun reject a way of doing politics? The answer may be both, but the larger message is clear: political parties may select candidates, but only the people can select governments.